On passwords that stay long after the party, a goddess who kept secrets for a living, and a demo where you get to be both people in the conversation sharing a password.
Someone new starts on Monday. They need the Wi-Fi password, the login to the test server and the key to the shared mailbox, so somebody pastes all three into the team chat. A year later the passwords are still there, two scrolls up, findable by anyone who types "password" into the search box. Nobody meant to keep them. The chat just never forgets. And the tracker. And the server logs. Your inbox?
What this is about. Fulla, a small open-source app you run yourself: you write a secret, it gives each recipient their own link, the link shows the secret once, and then it's gone. Why. Because the safest copy of a password is the one that no longer exists, and because the two tricks that make it work are worth stealing for any link that should only work once.
A goddess with a box
In Norse myth, Fulla is the goddess Frigg's attendant. She carries Frigg's box and shares her secrets. Since the platform this came from is named after Idun, the keeper of the apples, the name picked itself. And my friend's daughter is called Idun and she's cool.
A server that can't read what it keeps
The obvious way to build this has a hole in the middle: you send the password to a server, the server keeps it, and the server hands it out. Now the server, its backups and anyone who gets into it can read every secret ever shared.
So Fulla never sends the password at all. Your browser makes a random key, locks the secret with it, and sends only the locked version. The key goes into the link, after the #:
https://example.com/view#t=<token>&key=<key>
Browsers never send the part after # to a server. It doesn't show up in requests, in logs or in the server's database. The server stores a box it has no key to, and the recipient's browser unlocks it on their side. If someone stole the whole database tomorrow, they'd have a pile of locked boxes and no keys.
The scanner that clicks first
The second trick is about robots. Many company mail filters open every link in an incoming email before the person does, to check it for malware. That's good for them and terrible for a link that works once. If opening the link were enough to show the secret, the robot would see it first, and the actual recipient would get a polite "this has already been used".
So opening a Fulla link spends nothing. It shows a button. Only pressing Show secret fetches the box, and robots don't press buttons. The same trick works for sign-in links, which I wrote about in Don't let nginx do your app's homework.
Try it, and be both people
A tool like this is hard to show. The interesting part happens in someone else's inbox. So there's now a public demo at idunworks.com/fulla-demo, with no account and no email. You write a pretend secret and get the links, and next to each one is an Open as recipient button that opens it in a new tab. Press Show secret, read it, reload the tab. Gone.
That button only exists in the demo, and for a good reason. In real use, a sender who opens a recipient's link to check it has just used up that recipient's one look. In the demo you're both people, so it's fine.
The demo keeps everything small: secrets live ten minutes, three recipients at most, and everything is deleted within the hour. Please don't paste real passwords into it. It's the same code as the version you'd install, with one setting switched on, so what you try is what you'd run.
Benjamin Franklin put it best in Poor Richard's Almanack in 1735:
Three may keep a secret, if two of them are dead.
Fulla is gentler about it. One person reads the secret, and then nobody else can.
What we built, and how else you could do it
The problem was passwords that stay in chats and inboxes forever. The fix is a link per person that shows the secret once and then deletes it. The server could have read everything it stored, so the key now lives after the #, where it never reaches the server. Mail scanners would have used up the links, so opening a link only shows a button, and the secret is fetched when a person presses it.
There are other ways to get the same result:
Your password manager's sharing feature. If the team already uses one, this is the easiest way, and the secret sits next to the rest of your passwords. The catch is that it lives inside a paid product, and it works best when both sides use the same one.
A hosted one-time-secret service. Nothing to install, and it works today. You're trusting someone else's server and their uptime, though, and on some services that server can read what you send.
Another self-hosted tool, such as PrivateBin or Yopass. These are older and well tested, and they use the same key-after-the-
#idea. Fulla's own angle is one link per recipient, so you can see who has opened theirs, and only people you allow can create secrets.
Want to see it for yourself? Try the demo, or take the code from github.com/idunworks/fulla. It's MIT licensed, and one docker compose up gets you running.